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munity level, European regional policies do not appear to deliver. The
evidence suggests that neither eﬃciency gains nor reduced regional in-
equalities are attained. If there is any positive impact at all, then it is at
the most a redistributional one. If transfers are mainly redistributional
in nature, would policies based on non-distortionary financing be a bet-
ter route to follow? We ask what are the alternatives to a distortionary
regional policy forcing the delocation of activity. Are non-distortionary
policies always more eﬃcient than distortionary alternatives? We ana-
lyze these questions employing a new economic geography model, where
we also take into account the importance of knowledge spillovers for pro-
ductivity, industry location and policy. It is shown that the eﬀective-
ness of diﬀerent regional policy depends on (i) intra-industry knowledge
spillovers, (ii) inter-industry knowledge spillovers, and (iii) trade costs.
Our analysis provides insight into what may be the reason for the lack of
success of EU regional initiative.
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1 Introduction
Are increased regional inequalities and increased geographical concentration of
economic activity the flip side of the industrial restructuring following economic
integration and technological progress? Both theory and empirical evidence
may point in this direction (see e.g. Behrens, Gaigne´, Ottaviano and Thisse,
2003, Boldrin and Canova, 2001, Braunerhjelm et al, 2002, and Martin, 1998
and 1999). Hence, the focus on regional policy in Europe appears to be justified
and valid.
The objective of the European Commission, as set out in Article 130a of the
Treaty on European Union, is to ”promote harmonious development”. It aims
to achieve this by ”reducing disparities between the levels of development of the
various regions”. Its approach to economic cohesion has a political justification
”that wide disparities are intolerable in a community”, but also an economic
justification ”[imbalances ] indicate an under-utilization of human potential and
a failure to take advantage of economic opportunities which would benefit the
Union as a whole” (see e.g. European Commission, 1996). In other words, the
Commission expects regional policy to reduce inequalities while at the same
time increasing eﬃciency and overall social welfare in the Union.
However, while there may be a strong case for intervention, theoretical and
empirical studies make one question the success of current and recent regional
policy initiatives. EU spends around one third of its budget on regional support.
But despite the vast sums they absorb, European regional policies do not appear
to deliver: over the last two decades regional inequalities within member states
have not narrowed, and by some measures they have even widened (see e.g.
Braunerhjelm et al, 2000; and Puga, 2002). At the same time we also observe
that manufacturing activity has become more concentrated across regions (see
Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman, 2002).
As means of achieving its regional objectives, the EU has formulated policies
to attract firms to poor, peripheral regions, for in this way to increase invest-
ment, employment and productivity in these areas. Recent empirical work by
Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) suggests that in terms of aﬀecting in-
dustrial location, policy has indeed succeeded. Midelfart and Overman find that
policy has played a role in mitigating the economic forces at work in determining
industrial location in Europe over the last decade. But the direct impacts of
regional expenditures appear to be counter to economic determinants, thereby
causing the delocation of industrial activity. The outcome is then a pattern of
industrial location away from that which economic forces alone would deliver,
and this impedes an eﬃcient allocation of resources.
It is alarming that despite the substantial resources that are spent on regional
policy, the evidence suggests that neither eﬃciency gains nor reduced regional
inequalities are attained.1 On the contrary, so far what we observe are distor-
tionary location eﬀects and rising regional inequalities in terms of income and
manufacturing distribution. The historical counterfactual ”what would have
1This fact has triggered increased theoretical work related to regional policy design, see
e.g. Dupont and Martin, 2003, and Forslid, 2003 for recent contributions.
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happened without an active regional policy” is hard to construct. Could in-
equalities possibly have risen even more? However, according to Boldrin and
Canova (2001), regional expenditure (Structural Funds) does not appear to have
enhanced the productivity and capacity of the regions to which it is funneled.
This leads us onto the question we want to address in this paper: if regional
policies are mainly redistributional, are there policy initiatives that would be
more eﬃcient than those that are currently implemented? Hence, if we want to
eliminate regional inequalities, how do we do this at the lowest possible cost?
Current initiatives set up to reduce regional inequalities rely on a distor-
tionary financing scheme, as to a large extent they are based on the relocation
of activity to the periphery. We ask if regional policy initatives that rely on
direct income transfers financed over non-distortionary tax schemes would be
more eﬃcient, and if so, under what circumstances. Counter to what one might
expect based on insight from traditional public finance theory, it turns out that
non-distortionary alternatives are not always more eﬃcient.
We also show that, when setting up a non-distortionary tax scheme to finance
income transfers, there is a set of options. Again in contrast to what traditional
public finance theory would tell us, a tax scheme that relies on the taxation
of mobile factors only may — under certain circumstances — represent one such
non-distortionary option.
In order to address this set of issues, we employ a new economic geography
model. However, we use a model which relies not only on pecuniary externali-
ties, as most economic geography models do. Our model also takes into account
the role played by technological externalities for productivity, industry location
and policy. Critics of the new economic geography have noted that technolog-
ical externalities are in general absent from most models within this literature
(see Neary, 2001), although there are exceptions such as Baldwin et al (2001)
and Martin and Ottaviano (2001). Here we aim to meet this criticism by intro-
ducing one type of technological externalities, namely knowledge spillovers, in
our model. Over the last decade a number of studies, among others Audretsch
and Feldman (1996), have confirmed that knowledge spillovers are important,
and that they are typically very localized. Especially relevant for our analysis
of regional policy, is a study of knowledge spillovers within and across Euro-
pean regions by Bottazzi and Peri (2002). They find that knowledge spillovers
are typically much stronger within than between regions, and stronger within
industries than across industries. When setting up our model we draw on their
insight.
We integrate technological externalities in the form of localized knowledge
spillovers into a new economic geography framework, and allow for intra- as well
as inter-industry knowledge spillovers arising from knowledge intensive activity.
Our set-up allows us to explore how pecuniary externalities that characterize
the new economic geography models interact with knowledge spillovers in de-
termining the location of industry and optimal regional policy design.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present a new economic
geography model incorporating localized intra- and inter-industry knowledge
spillovers. In section 3 we characterize the asymmetric equilibrium supported by
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the model. This is taken to be the market outcome absent of policy intervention,
and implies an uneven geographical distribution of economic activity between
a core and the periphery. Section 4 investigates the impact of a set of regional
policy initiatives according to their achievements in terms of equity and welfare.
Section 5 concludes.
2 A model of industrial location
Our point of departure is an economic geography model which builds on Krug-
man (1990) and Forslid and Ottaviano (2003). The economy we consider con-
sists of two regions; i = 1, 2. There are two types of factors of production:
unskilled (LUi) and skilled labor (LSi). Unskilled labor is immobile between re-
gions, while skilled labor is regionally mobile. Each region has a fixed and equal
amount of unskilled labor, LU1 = L
U
2 = L
U . Total supply of skilled labor in the
economy equals LS1 + L
S
2 = L
S
W . Subscripts indicate region of employment.
Production takes place in two sectors, A and B: Sector A is perfectly com-
petitive and produces a homogenous good under constant returns to scale, and
it only employs unskilled labor. Sector B is monopolistically competitive and
produces diﬀerentiated goods employing both unskilled and skilled labor, and
faces increasing returns to scale in production captured by a linear cost func-
tion. Skilled workers only enter into the fixed cost, while unskilled labor only
enters the variable cost of production. Hence, fixed costs are typically thought
to represent skill intensive activities like R&D, while variable costs represent
unskill intensive activities such as assembly.
The economy is characterized by the prevalence of localized intra- as well as
inter-industry knowledge spillovers. We do not analyze the micro foundations
of the positive externalities, but just note that they are a type of technological
externalities. The source of these spillovers is the knowledge intensive activity
in sector B, and the spillovers work both within the sector B and between this
sector and the sector A. However, as the spillovers are assumed local in nature,
they only work within a region and not across regions. This implies that both
sector A and sector B productivity in a given region i depend on the level of
activity in sector B in this region. Since skilled labor is only employed by sector
B, there is a one to one relationship between level of B activity and number of
skilled workers in region i, and thus between productivity and stock of skilled
labor in a region. In line with empirical evidence we further assume intra- to
be stronger than inter-industry spillovers, see e.g. Bottazzi and Peri, 2002.
The combination of inter-regional mobile skilled labor, trade costs and in-
creasing returns to scale gives rise to localized pecuniary externalities and self-
reinforcing industrial agglomeration driven by demand and supply linkages (see
e.g. Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999, for further discussion of the features
of economic geography models).
Consumer preferences are given by the utility function
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U = C1−µA C
µ
B , 0 < µ < 1. (1)
where CA and CB denote consumption of goods from the sectors A and B,
respectively, and µ is the expenditure share on B goods. The A-good is chosen as
numeraire. It is costlessly traded across regions, and its market price, pA, is thus
equal to unity. Sector A uses only unskilled labor, while its productivity (ϕi)
depends on the extent of localized inter-industry knowledge spillovers received
from sector B activity. By choice of scale, unit labor requirement in the A-sector
in the home country is one, which gives unskilled wages
wUi = ϕi = ϕ
¡
LSi
¢
, (2)
with ϕi ≥ 1, ϕ (0) = 1, ϕ0i > 0, ϕ00i < 0.
Demand for good A is assumed large enough to guarantee that sector A is
active in both regions irrespectively of the location of other production sectors.
In other words, we assume consumer preferences to be so that a single location
alone cannot supply the total economy with A goods. This will be true when
good A has a large weight in utility (µ small) and product variety is highly
valued by consumers (σ is small), and implies that wages for unskilled labor are
given across regions.
The consumption of goods from sector B is defined as an aggregate of n
diﬀerentiated goods, CM ≡
hPn
k=1 c
σ−1
σ
k
i σ
σ−1
with σ > 1, where ck represents
consumption of each good. Each producer operates under increasing returns
to scale at the level of the plant, and in line with Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) we
assume that there is large group monopolistic competition between firms in the
B sector. Thus, both the perceived elasticity of demand and the elasticity of
substitution between any pair of diﬀerentiated goods are equal to σ.
A representative firm B in region i produces its output xi using a fixed input
of ρiα units of skilled labor and a marginal input of ρiβ units of unskilled labor
who earns the wage wSi . The cost function reflects the presence of localized
intra-industry knowledge spillovers (ρi), and is given by
TCi = ρi
¡
wSi α+wUi βxi
¢
, (3)
with ρi = ρ
¡
LSi
¢
, ρ (0) = 1, ρ0
¡
LSi
¢
< 0, ρ00
¡
LSi
¢
> 0.
All producers have access to the same technology, so prices do not diﬀer
between firms in a given region. Since firms face a constant demand elasticity
they set a constant markup σσ−1 over marginal costs, the f.o.b. price from region
i = h, f, is given by
pi =
σ
σ − 1βρiϕi, (4)
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B goods are tradeable, but we assume Samuelson iceberg type transport
costs, so that only 1τ of each unit shipped actually reaches its destination. This
means that the c.i.f. price is τ times higher than the f.o.b. price of a locally
produced good. Due to free entry there are zero profits in sector B. Using the
zero profit condition in combination with the expression for price and the cost
function, we have that
xi =
wSi α (σ − 1)
βϕi
(5)
in equilibrium. Choosing units so that β = σ−1σ , we have producer prices
pi = ρiϕi, and equilibrium quantities xi = wSi σαϕ−1i . As noted by Forslid
and Ottaviano (2003) market structure and technology imply that monopolis-
tic rents arise due to product diﬀerentiation and are absorbed by skilled labor’s
wages. Given the fixed input requirement of skilled labor in sector B, skilled
labor market clearing implies that in equilibrium the number of type B firms
in region i is determined by
ni =
LSi
αρi
. (6)
Taking the dual of CM we find that the price index for good B is
Qi =
h
nip
1−σ
i + nj (τpj)
1−σ
i 1
1−σ
i 6= j, (7)
where ni and nj are the number of varieties produced in regions i and j, and
total number of varieties in the economy equals n = n1 + n2. Accordingly, the
consumer price index can be expressed as
Pi = p
1−µ
A Q
µ
i i = h, f. (8)
Local disposable income in region i (Yi) consists of unskilled and skilled
earnings:
Yi = w
S
i L
S
i +w
U
i L
U
i (9)
We use Shepard’s lemma to derive local (xii) and foreign (xij) demand for a
variety of the B good produced in region i:
xii = p
−σ
i Q
σ−1
i µYi, xij = p
−σ
i Q
σ−1
j τ1−σµYj , i 6= j. (10)
Using (10) and the zero profit condition, the product market equilibrium in
sector B takes the form
wSi σαϕ−1i ≥ p−σi
£
Qσ−1i µYi + τ1−σQσ−1j µYj
¤
, ni ≥ 0, i 6= j. (11)
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Factor market clearing requires that the supply of unskilled labor (LUi ) in
equilibrium is equal to demand for unskilled labor in sector A and sector B
so that LUi = L
U
Ai + L
U
Bi. Using Shephard’s lemma on equation (3) to derive
labor demand in sector B, and substituting for quantities and number of firms
employing (5) and (6)we can rewrite the labor market clearing condition as
LUAi = L
U
i −wSi (σ − 1)LSi ϕ−1i . (12)
The spatial equilibrium is determined by (2), (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), and (11),
(12) which gives equilibrium values of the endogenous variables pi, xi, ni, Qi,
Yi, w
S
i , w
U
i , and L
U
Ai.
The spatial structure of the economy is determined by the location decision
of the skilled workers. Following Krugman (1991) we assume that workers are
short sighted and choose location as to maximize their current indirect utility,
µµ (1− µ)(1−µ)wSi P−1i . Migration between regions 1 and 2 is thus governed by
the current indirect utility diﬀerential
V = µµ (1− µ)(1−µ)
µ
wS1
Qµ1
− w
S
2
Qµ2
¶
. (13)
It follows that all interior equilibria, i.e. equilibria with a positive number of B
firms in each region, require that wS1 /Q
µ
1 = w
S
2 /Q
µ
2 , while asymmetric equilibria
with complete agglomeration of skilled workers and sector B in one region i are
equilibria if and only if, wSi /Q
µ
i > w
S
j /Q
µ
j . An asymmetric equilibrium is always
stable if it is an equilibrium.
3 The market outcome: A Core-periphery equi-
librium
Our analysis focuses on the design of regional policy given a situation where the
market outcome would be one characterized by a high degree of concentration of
industrial activity in one region. We do this by using as our point of departure
an asymmetric — so-called core-periphery — equilibrium where all skill intensive
activity, i.e. sector B, is concentrated in one region, say region 1. We shall refer
to this region as the core (C) and to region 2 as the periphery (P ). Expressed
formally, this implies that number of B firms in the two regions are respectively
nC =
LSW
αρC
, nP = 0, (14)
where the subscript C depicts core region variables and the subscript P
periphery variables. It follows that manufacturing production only takes place
in the core, that unskilled wages in the periphery are equal to unity (wUP =
ϕP = 1), and that equilibrium quantity of each produced variety is
xC =
µσα (ϕC + 1)LU
(σ − µ)ϕCLSW
. (15)
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All skilled workers reside in the core and earn wages
wSC =
µ (ϕC + 1)LU
(σ − µ)LSW
. (16)
We assume that (ϕC + 1) /ϕC > (σ − µ)LSW/µLU , i.e. wSC > wSU = ϕC ,
which — in line with empirical evidence — means that skilled workers earn a higher
wage than unskilled workers. This holds as longs as inter-industry spillovers
are not too high, the expenditure share on B goods is not too low, and the
substitutability of varieties produced in sector B is relatively low.
Income in the two regions is respectively
YC =
σϕC + µ
σ − µ L
U , YP = L
U , (17)
and consumers face price indices
QC =
µ
LSW
αρC
¶ 1
1−σ
ϕCρC , QP = τQC. (18)
For a core-periphery equilibrium to exist and be stable, it follows from the mi-
gration rule explained above, that real earnings in the core must exceed real
earnings in the periphery. Using (13) and (18) this gives the stability (sustain-
ability) condition
wSC
wSP
>
1
τµ . (19)
which must hold for the core-periphery pattern to be a stable equilibrium. Sub-
stituting for LS1 = L
S
W and L
S
2 = 0 we rewrite (19) as
σ (ϕC + 1)ϕ1−σC
µ
ρP
ρC
¶σ
τµ+1−σ − (σϕC + µ) τ2(1−σ) − σ + µ > 0. (20)
Our analysis rests on the condition that parameter values characterizing
the state of technology and the economy are within the range supporting the
sustainability of the core-periphery equilibrium depicted by condition (20).
The market outcome entails regional inequalities as unskilled workers in the
periphery have real earnings that are clearly below those of unskilled workers
in the core. The gap in real earnings will depend on the magnitude of inter-
industry spillovers and trade costs, and is given by:
wUC/QC
wUP /QP
= ϕCτ . (21)
For an illustration of (21), see Figure 1.
{Figure 1}
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4 Regional policies
Our aim is to evaluate a set of regional policy initiatives according to their
impact on regional inequalities, the welfare of diﬀerent groups of labor, as well
as on social welfare of the economy as a whole. We seek to answer the following
question: given that we want to reduce regional inequalities, how do we do this
at the lowest possible cost — i.e. in the most eﬃcient way?
First, we consider the impact of a regional policy that aims at reducing
regional inequalities by forcing an allocation of industry diﬀerent from the one
that market forces would deliver. Such a policy provides a simplified — but
useful — portray of current European regional policies, which to a large extent
have aimed, and aim, at attracting firms to poor peripheral locations.2
Second, we examine the impact of regional policies where one seeks to
eliminate regional inequalities through direct income transfers based on non-
distortionary transfer schemes. We explore two possible tax schemes as basis
for a non-distortionary financing: (i) a national general tax scheme, and (ii) a
tax on the mobile and agglomeration specific factor, i.e. skilled labor.
We compare how the diﬀerent regional policies aﬀect welfare of individual
groups and social welfare of the economy as a whole. We discuss what type of
policy that is most eﬃcient under what circumstances.
Our point of departure is a core-periphery equilibrium and a government
with the objective to eliminate regional inequalities, so as to ensure that un-
skilled workers in the periphery get the same real earnings as the unskilled
workers in the core, i.e. wUC/Q
µ
C = w
U
P /Q
µ
P .
Regional policies are, however, often rather unclear with respect to their
objectives. These will in general always be about reducing regional income
inequalities to allow for horizontal equity. Additionally, they may be about re-
ducing personal income inequalities, to obtain vertical equity. While the former
implies closing the gap in real earnings across regions for unskilled workers, the
latter implies reducing the gap in real earnings between unskilled and skilled
labor. Here we assume that the objective of the government is limited to pro-
viding horizontal equity. As we shall see however, the policies we consider do
diﬀer in their eﬀect on vertical equity.
4.1 Policy I: Relocation of activities to the periphery
We first consider how inducing relocation of economic activity can allow for
regional inequalities to be eliminated, i.e. wUC/Q
µ
C = w
U
P /Q
µ
P . Since regions are
assumed to be identical along all dimensions, this objective can only be met if
an equal distribution of sector B activity across the two regions is achieved. In
order to enable a policy evaluation, we solve the model for such a symmetric
equilibrium and let the equilibrium values be denoted by a subscript S.
2The EU conducts a policy of relocation spending large amounts on direct and indirect
subsidies. These types of additional costs related to the delocation of activity are not included
in our welfare assessment. This should however, be kept in mind when the diﬀerent policy
interventions are compared.
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Number of firms in the two regions is given by
nS = nS =
LSW
2αρS
, (22)
with ρS = ρ
³
LSW
2
´
. From (3) it follows that ρS > ρC , and that due to local-
ized intra-industry knowledge spillovers total number of firms in the economy is
smaller under a symmetric equilibrium than under an asymmetric equilibrium.
As for equilibrium quantity of each produced variety and wages for skilled work-
ers these are given by
xS =
2µσαLU
(σ − µ)LSW
. (23)
wSS =
2µϕSLU
(σ − µ)LSW
. (24)
respectively with ϕS = ϕ
³
LSW
2
´
. Income in each of the two regions under the
symmetric equilibrium is
YS =
σϕS
σ − µL
U . (25)
We observe that total income in the economy is higher under the symmetric
equilibrium than under the asymmetric equilibrium, cf. (17) and (25). This
is due to the existence of inter-industry knowledge spillovers. It implies that
the distribution of sector B activity across regions aﬀects total income of the
economy, and is then higher under the symmetric than under the asymmetric
equilibrium. In the absense of inter-industry spillovers, total income would be
unaﬀected by the localization of sector B activity. Because of this income eﬀect,
we also have that quantities and skilled wages are higher under the symmetric
than under the asymmetric equilibrium, xS > xC and w
S
S > w
S
C .
Consumers face price indices
QS =
µ¡
1 + τ1−σ
¢ LSW
2αρS
¶ 1
1−σ
ϕSρS. (26)
In the absence of inter-industry spillovers, QC < QS, cf. (18), due to intra-
industry spillovers. But the presence of inter-industry spillovers serves to drive
up unskilled wages, and in turn prices on B goods, so that the magnitude of
QS relative to QC is not unambiguous, but dependent on parameter values, and
particularly dependent on intra- relative to inter-industry spillovers. From (18)
and (26) it follows that QC < QS holds ifµ
ρS
ρC
¶ 1
1−σ
| {z }
Intra−effect
µ
2
1 + τ1−σ
¶ 1
1−σ
| {z }
TC−effect
ϕCρC
ϕSρS| {z }
Pr ice−effect
< 1. (27)
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The term denoted Intra-eﬀect is always less than unity, and reflects the
fact that with intra-industry spillovers a core-periphery equilibrium allows for a
greater total number of varieties than what is the case in a symmetric equilib-
rium. In the presence of positive trade costs the second term, denoted TC-eﬀect,
will also be less than unity. But as for the term denoted Price-eﬀect, which de-
picts the price on B goods under a core-periphery equilibrium relative to that
under a symmetric equilibrium, this may be less than or greater than unity
depending on the magnitude of intra- versus inter-industry spillovers. As noted
above, our analysis is based on the assumption that intra-industry knowledge
spillovers are stronger than inter-industry knowledge spillovers. Formally, this
means that ϕCρC ≤ ϕSρS, and implies that QC < QS will always hold.
Our welfare assessment is based on a comparison of real earnings for the
three groups of inhabitants of the economy — the skilled workers in the core
(V SC ) , the unskilled workers in the core (V
U
C ) , and the unskilled workers in the
periphery (V UP ) — and on the sum of their real earnings as a measure of total
social welfare.
We proceed by examining how real earnings change as government interven-
tion moves us from the market equilibrium that is characterized by industrial
agglomeration in one region, to one with equal distribution of activity between
the two regions. Formally expressed we have that changes in welfare are given
by:
∆V SC =
wSS
PS
− w
S
C
PC
=
µLU
(σ − µ)LSW


1
QµS
(2ϕS − (ϕC + 1))| {z }
IE>0
− (ϕC + 1)
µ
1
QµC
− 1
QµS
¶
| {z }
PE<0


(28)
∆V UC =
wUS
PS
− w
U
C
PC
=
1
QµS
(ϕS − ϕC)| {z }
IE<0
−ϕC
µ
1
QµC
− 1
QµS
¶
| {z }
PE<0
< 0 (29)
∆V UP =
wUS
PS
− w
U
P
PP
=
1
QµS
(ϕS − 1)| {z }
IE>0
+
µ
1
QµS
− 1
QµP
¶
| {z }
PE≶0
(30)
It is possible to split the impact of policy intervention on real earnings into
two types of eﬀects: an income eﬀect (IE) and a price eﬀect (PE). In the
absence of inter-industry spillovers, this eﬀect is zero for all three groups. In
this case the location of sector B activity neither aﬀects wages in sector A
nor total income of the economy, cf. the discussion above. But with positive
inter-industry spillovers, policy intervention entails a positive income eﬀect for
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skilled workers in the core and unskilled workers in the periphery, but a negative
income eﬀect for unskilled workers in the core.
The term PE depicts the price eﬀect, and is negative for skilled and unskilled
workers in the core, while ambiguous for unskilled workers in the periphery. It
is negative for the inhabitants of the core, because (i) trade costs now have to
be paid on one half of the B goods consumed, and (ii) a reduced number of
varieties are now being oﬀered. The PE eﬀect reflects that policy intervention
prevents the exploitation of positive externalities. Whether the inhabitants of
the periphery experience a net gain or net loss from the policy initiative depends
on the magnitude of trade costs relative to the reduction in number of varieties.
Figures 2, 3 and 4 provide graphical illustrations of the welfare assessment
for the individual groups of inhabitants. They are drawn for three cases:
(i) Zero knowledge spillovers: no knowledge spillovers;
(ii)Relatively strong intra-industry knowledge spillovers: intra-industry knowl-
edge spillovers are strong relative to inter-industry spillovers;
(iii)Relatively weak intra-industry knowledge spillovers: intra-industry knowl-
edge spillovers exceed inter-industry spillovers but less so than in case (ii).
{Figures 2,3,4}
The diagrams communicate the eﬀect of trade costs and inter- and intra-
industry knowledge spillovers on the impact of policy interventions. The gains
that unskilled workers in the periphery may enjoy, and the losses skilled workers
and unskilled workers in the core experience, are higher the higher are trade
costs. In the absence of localized spillovers both gains and losses approach zero
as trade costs go to zero as location ceases to matter (Figure 2). However, with
localized spillovers we see that the location of activity never ceases to matter for
productivity and, hence, nor for eﬃciency and social welfare. As a consequence,
policy intervention causing relocation has a negative impact on real earnings of
skilled and unskilled labor in the core. The reduction in earnings is, in fact, most
significant for the unskilled in the core, since relocation of sector B activity to the
other region aﬀects both their nominal as well as their real earnings negatively:
the moving of sector B activity means that spillovers aﬀecting their productivity
and wages are lost, at the same time as a share of their B goods consumption
now has to be imported from the other region (see Figures 3 and 4). As for
unskilled workers in the periphery they will typically gain from relocation if
trade costs are high and inter-industry spillovers significant relative to intra-
industry spillovers. But for low trade costs and relatively high intra-industry
spillovers they may actually lose because of the regional policy initiative (see
Figures 3 and 4).
Net change in social welfare for the economy as a whole is given by
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³X
V
´Policy1
−
³X
V
´Market
(31)
= ∆V SC LSW +∆V UC LU +∆V UP LU
=
2σLUϕS
(σ − µ)QµS
− µL
U (ϕC + 1)
(σ − µ)QµC
− (ϕC + 1)L
U
QµC
− L
U
QµCτµ
The diﬀerence in impact on social welfare of the economy caused by a policy
inducing relocation consequently also depends on the prevalence and magnitude
of localized inter- and intra-industry spillovers, as can be seen from Figure 5 .
For any given level of trade costs, the net loss to the economy due to a relo-
cation policy will be greater the more significant are intra-industry knowledge
spillovers, but smaller the more significant are inter-industry externalities. Irre-
spective of the magnitude and nature of knowledge spillovers, we also see that
the impact of relocation is a non-monotonic function of trade cost. This fol-
lows from what is a general feature of new economic geography models, namely
that the forces for — and the rents from — agglomeration are greatest for an
intermediate level of trade costs, see e.g. Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999).
{Figure 5}
Our modelling of a policy of relocation allows for an illustration of what has
been pointed out to be a potential disadvantage of European regional policies:
While seeking cohesion they may impede economies from realizing the gains from
regional specialization and agglomeration enabled by advancing technologies and
labor mobility (see in particular Sapir et al, 2003). But the analysis also makes
clear, that by inducing relocation the EU may enhance inter-industry spillovers
and thus productivity and earnings in poor peripheral regions.
Important to note is that the numerical simulations used for the welfare
assessment are based on — and drawn for — parameter values that support an
asymmetric market equilibrium.3 For the chosen set of parameter values the
market equilibrium with agglomeration is always superior to the dispersed equi-
librium induced by policy interventions in terms of total social welfare. 4
3See the appendix for parameter values.
4It should be noted though, that for high trade cost there may be parameter spaces for
which the agglomeration is sustainable, but where there are multiple equilibria, and where
dispersion of activity would typically provide higher social welfare. Ottaviano and Thisse,
1999, also address the optimality of an asymmetric versus a symmetric equilibrium, but do
so using another model of monpolistic competition than the one used in most of the existing
litterature on economic geography, namely the Dixit-Stiglitz model, which is also employed
here. They find that for an intermediate range of trade costs, the market yields agglomeration
although dispersion is superior. On the other hand, Norman and Venables (2001) find that the
market always produces too little agglomeration. A review of existing results as well as our
own, thus makes it very clear that the optimality of agglomeration as such very much depends
on specific assumptions underlying the chosen model. This implies that one should be careful
presenting unambiguous and general conclusions on the optimality of spatial structures.
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4.2 Policy II: Direct income transfers to the periphery
financed by a national tax
The second type of policy we consider is one which ensures horizontal equity
in terms of wUC/Q
µ
C = w
U
P /Q
µ
P using direct income transfers financed over a
non-distortive tax scheme. The income subsidy (s) to the unskilled workers in
the periphery is funded by a national income tax (t). Given the objective of the
government, the policy initiative therefore has to provide
(1− t)ϕC
PC
=
(1− t) (1 + s)
PP
. (32)
From (32) it follows that such a transfer scheme implies a subsidy equal to
s = ϕCτµ − 1. (33)
The budget condition underlying such a policy initiative is given by
sLU = t
¡
wSCL
S
W + ϕCLU + (1 + s)LU
¢
, (34)
from which we derive the equilibrium tax rate
t =
(ϕCτµ − 1) (σ − µ)
ϕCσ + µ+ (σ − µ)ϕCτµ
. (35)
Direct transfers to inhabitants of the periphery imply reduced real earnings for
skilled workers (V SC ) and unskilled workers (V
U
C ) in the core region, due to the
tax burden put on them in order to subsidize consumers in the periphery. On
the other hand they entail increased real earnings for unskilled workers (V UP )
in the periphery. Unlike a policy based on relocation of activity, a policy of
direct income transfers has only an income eﬀect, but no price eﬀect. Formally
expressed we have:
∆V SC =
(1− t)wSC
PC
− w
S
C
PC
(36)
= − µL
U
(σ − µ)LSW
1
QµC
(ϕC + 1)
(ϕCτµ − 1) (σ − µ)
ϕCσ + µ+ (σ − µ)ϕCτµ
< 0
∆V UC =
(1− t)ϕC
PC
− ϕC
PC
= −ϕC
QµC
(ϕCτµ − 1) (σ − µ)
ϕCσ + µ+ (σ − µ)ϕCτµ
< 0 (37)
∆V UP =
(1− t)(1 + s)
PP
− 1
PP
(38)
=
1
τµQµC
µ
(ϕCτµ − 1)− ϕCτµ
(ϕCτµ − 1) (σ − µ)
ϕCσ + µ+ (σ − µ)ϕCτµ
¶
> 0
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Net change in social welfare for the economy as a whole is consequently given
by
³X
V
´Policy2
−
³X
V
´Market
(39)
= ∆V SC LSW +∆V UC LU +∆V UP LU
= −L
U (τµ − 1) (µ+ ϕCσ) (ϕCτµ − 1)
QµC (ϕCσ + µ+ (σ − µ)ϕCτµ)
< 0,
and is always negative. The impact of a regional policy based on direct
income transfers is illustrated graphically in Figure 6. We see that policy inter-
vention implies a welfare loss, but this decreases monotonically in trade costs,
for eventually to vanish for zero trade costs, at which point equilibrium subsidies
equal zero.
{Figure 6}
Due to the fact that the tax scheme that funds the subsidies to the periphery
is levied economy wide, the location of economic activity is not aﬀected by the
policy intervention, and nor is thus the stability of asymmetric market equilib-
rium aﬀected by the policy intervention. In other words, the financing of the
policy initiative is non-distortionary.
We want to compare the change in social welfare induced by this latter
policy initiative with that induced by the policy forcing relocation discussed in
the previous section. We find that the diﬀerential impact of the former on social
welfare is given by
∆
³X
V
´PolicyIIversusMarket
−∆
³X
V
´PolicyIversusMarket
(40)
=
σLU
(σ − µ)
·
(ϕC + 1) (1− t)
QµC
− 2ϕS
QµS
¸
≶ 0
and is conveyed graphically in Figure 7. The diﬀerential impact on so-
cial welfare is a non-monotonic function of trade costs. Counter to what we
would expect based on insight from traditional public finance theory, a distor-
tionary policy may actually prove more eﬃcient than a policy that is based on
a non-distortive financing. Eliminating regional inequalities through relocation
of activity instead of through direct income transfers, will typically be more
eﬃcient if trade costs are high, intra-industry spillovers relatively insignificant,
and inter-industry spillovers relatively significant.
{Figure 7}
However, as trade costs decline and the magnitude of the subsidy needed to
abolish regional inequalities diminishes, the relative eﬃciency of a direct trans-
fer policy increases, for then to reach a maximum for an intermediate to low
15
level of trade cost. The non-monotonic patterns follow from the important fea-
ture of the model that the agglomeration rents produced by localized pecuniary
externalities, are hump shaped in trade costs. The eﬃciency loss from a distor-
tionary relative to a non-distortionary financed policy is thus most significant
for the level of trade costs at which agglomeration rents peak.
Figure 7 illustrates that increased intra-industry knowledge spillovers am-
plify the relative eﬃciency gain related to the choice of a regional policy of
direct income subsidies over a regional policy of relocation, while increased inter-
industry knowledge spillovers work in the other direction.
4.3 Policy III: Direct income transfers to the periphery
financed by a tax on the industrial agglomeration
The third type of regional policy we consider, is also a direct income transfer
to the periphery, but this time financed via a tax on the mobile, agglomeration
specific factor only. The location decision of the mobile factor — skilled labor
— determines the spatial structure of the economy and is responsible for the
emergence of the industrial agglomeration in the core. A basic insight from the
public finance literature is that an optimal tax scheme is one that avoids taxing
mobile factors, and instead levies taxes on immobile factors, as the former is
distortionary in nature while the latter is not (see e.g., Gordon, 1986, Frenkel,
Razin and Sadka, 1991, and Bucovetsky andWilson, 1991). In order to minimize
the eﬃciency loss related to the acquiring of funds for transfers, one would
thus reckon that a tax on the industrial agglomeration to fund transfers to the
periphery would be a less preferred alternative.
However, recent contributions to the tax literature which merge insights from
the new economic geography theory with public finance theory, have shown that
the agglomeration rents generated by an industrial agglomeration aﬀect the tax
elasticity of the factors employed by the agglomeration (see Baldwin et al, 2003,
Kind et al, 2000, and Ludema and Wooton, 2000). In particular, it has been
found that the existence of agglomeration rents implies that the mobile factors
of an industrial agglomeration will be tax inelastic up to a certain threshold. Up
to this threshold, a government may use taxes to extract rents from the agglom-
eration without aﬀecting the sustainability of the agglomeration, i.e. without
being distortionary and causing the delocation of activity.
Introducing an economy wide income tax to fund subsidies to the periphery
may be reckoned as diﬃcult in political terms, since it levies a significant tax
burden also on low income groups, i.e. the unskilled labor in the core. In
order to lighten this burden, a tax on the high income group may appear as an
attractive alternative. Moreover, a tax on skilled labor only implies that while
achieving the goal of horizontal equity, the government is in addition also able
to reduce personal income inequalities and thereby improve vertical equity.
The government introduces a income subsidy to the periphery that allows for
real earnings of unskilled labor in the periphery to be equal to those of unskilled
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labor in the core, i.e.
ϕC
PC
=
(1 + s)
PP
, (41)
and let it be financed by a tax on the skilled labor employed by the agglom-
eration.5
As long as this scheme does not aﬀect the sustainability of the industrial
agglomeration, it will neither aﬀect prices, equilibrium quantities and number of
firms, nor wages before tax. As before, the objective function of the government
implies a subsidy s = ϕCτµ − 1. The government’s budget condition is now
given by twSCL
S
W = sL
U , so that the equilibrium tax rate equals
t =
(σ − µ) (ϕCτµ − 1)
µ (ϕC + 1)
. (42)
In terms of changes in real earnings induced by the policy intervention, we have
that:
∆V SC =
wSC
PC
− (1− t)w
S
C
PC
(43)
= − µL
U
(σ − µ)LSW
1
QµC
(ϕC + 1)
(σ − µ) (ϕCτµ − 1)
µ (ϕC + 1)
< 0
∆V UC = 0 (44)
∆V UP =
1 + s
PP
− 1
PP
=
(ϕCτµ − 1)
QµP
> 0 (45)
Compared to the economy-wide-funded transfer policy examined in the previous
section, we see that the increase in real earnings received by unskilled in the
periphery is in this case more substantial (cf. (38) and (45)). The reduction
in welfare experienced by the skilled workers in the core is on the other hand
greater (cf. (36) and (43)). As unskilled in the core are not aﬀected by a tax
on the mobile factors of the agglomeration, they are better oﬀ than they would
have been with the formerly considered regional policy.
The enlarged loss in net real earnings experienced by skilled labor in the core
is due to the fact that (i) they have to carry the burden of funding the transfer
scheme alone, and (ii) net sum of transfers to the periphery is higher. The
net sum is higher because net real earnings of unskilled workers in the core are
5We note that the working of such a scheme is identical to one where one levies a tax on
parts of firms’ cost, namely those linked to the agglomeration specific factor — skilled labour.
17
higher as they do not have to pay taxes, and this in turn means that horizontal
equity implies greater transfers.
Net change in welfare for the economy as a whole is given by
³X
V
´Policy3
−
³X
V
´Market
=
(ϕCτµ − 1)LU
QµC
µ
1
τµ − 1
¶
< 0. (46)
Figure 8 allows us to compare the welfare eﬀects on the three diﬀerent re-
gional policies initiatives I-III. It is drawn for relatively strong intra-industry
knowledge spillovers. The main message is that policy III is always inferior to
policy II in terms of total social welfare. This can also be seen by comparing
(39) and (46). The reason is simply that in the latter case there is a greater
transfer to the periphery, and in turn a more significant loss in total welfare, as
consumption here incurs vasteful trade cost.
{Figure 8}
But unlike the tax scheme employed to fund transfers to the periphery ex-
amined in the previous section, a tax levied on the mobile factors of the agglom-
eration may aﬀect the stability of the industrial agglomeration. In contrast to
an economy wide tax, the latter tax scheme may distort the allocation of eco-
nomic activity. In order to investigate this further, we derive the condition for
the industrial agglomeration to exist and be stable in the case with a tax on the
mobile factor of the agglomeration. As skilled workers are confronted with a tax
in the core region, they will stay in the core as long as (1−t)wSC/Q
µ
C > w
S
P/Q
µ
P .
This implies that the asymmetric equilibrium remains stable as long as
(1− t)σ (ϕC + 1)ϕ1−σC
µ
ρP
ρC
¶σ
τµ+1−σ − (σϕC + µ) τ2(1−σ) − σ + µ > 0.
(47)
For a tax on skilled labor in the core not to have any distortionary eﬀects,
and thus not to induce delocation of industrial activity, it follows from (47) that
a tax rate cannot exceed the threshold level t∗:
t < t∗ =
σ (ϕC + 1)ϕ1−σC
³
ρP
ρC
´σ
τµ+1−σ − (σϕC + µ) τ2(1−σ) − σ + µ
(ϕC + 1)ϕ1−σC
³
ρP
ρC
´σ
τµ+1−σ
(48)
Figure 9 provides a graphical illustration of the tax scheme that would have
to be levied in order to attain regional equity in terms of real earnings for
unskilled labor as per (42), and of the tax rate that would be consistent with
sustaining the industrial agglomeration in the core. With respect to the former,
we see that an equity providing tax rate is obviously an increasing function of
trade costs, since the higher the trade costs the greater the gap in real earnings
that has to be closed by the tax. As for the latter, we see that an agglomeration
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sustaining tax rate is typically hump shaped in trade costs, reflecting the fact
that the rents from agglomeration peak at an intermediate level of trade costs.
The intersection of the two curves in Figure 9 gives the trade cost level below
which a tax scheme merely based on the taxation of skilled mobile labor allows
for inter-regional equality without aﬀecting the sustainability of the industrial
agglomeration. From (48) and Figure 9 it can be seen that, the more signifi-
cant the localized intra-industry knowledge spillovers (measured by ρP /ρC), the
higher is ceteris paribus the tax rate that is consistent with sustaining of the
agglomeration. Graphically, enhanced spillovers imply an upward shift in the
hump shaped curve. Comparative static on (48) further reveals that the thresh-
old level t∗ is increasing in market linkages (µ) and decreasing in elasticity of
substitution (σ). On the other hand, the greater are inter-industry spillovers,
the lower the tax rate that allows for the agglomeration to be sustained.
{Figure 9}
The graphical illustration and the inequality in (48) inform us about the
extent to which taxation of the mobile factors to which the rents from the indus-
trial agglomeration accrue, can be used as a means to funding a regional transfer
scheme. We see that this depends on degree and type of knowledge spillovers,
market linkages, trade costs and elasticity of substitution — the latter measuring
degree of product market competition. For high trade cost, relatively insignifi-
cant intra-industry spillovers and relatively significant inter-industry spillovers,
funding a regional policy initiative purely by taxing the industrial agglomeration
in the core may indeed not be an alternative at all. But for significant intra-
industry spillovers, weak inter-industry spillovers, and lower trade cost there
may indeed be scope for such a policy.
This means that under certain circumstances a government has the option
to introduce a regional policy that not only allows for horizontal equity, but also
allows it to reduce the gap between low- and high-income groups. Hence, the
tax scheme allows for a more even distribution of agglomeration rents across the
economy and improves vertical equity.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have addressed questions related to optimal regional policy
design. Our analysis shows that optimal design of regional policy depends on
level of trade costs, and degree of pecuniary externalities, magnitude of localized
inter- and intra-industry knowledge spillovers, and degree of product market
competition.
We have compared a distortionary regional policy forcing relocation of ac-
tivity with regional policy based on direct income transfer financed over non-
distortionary tax schemes. We find that the relocation alternative is least attrac-
tive for intermediate trade costs and high intra-industry knowledge spillovers.
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But for high trade cost, insignificant intra-industry knowledge spillovers and rel-
atively more significant inter-industry spillovers this type of policy may actually
be more eﬃcient.
Furthermore, if a government aims at designing a regional policy that not
only eliminates regional inequalities but also reduces personal inequalities, tax-
ing the industrial agglomeration in the core region may be an attractive al-
ternative. However, it will only be a feasible alternative when there are high
intra-industry relative to inter-industry spillovers and trade costs are relatively
low.
Can the analysis above teach us anything about why EU regional policy has
not been more of a success? It probably can. The EU has designed a regional
policy whose success actually relies on the prevalence of inter-industry positive
externalities. When it appears not to have delivered according to expectations,
this may indeed be about the magnitude of inter- relative to intra-industry
externalities. If the latter type of positive externalities is more prevalent than
the former type, a policy inducing the relocation of activity will do more harm
in terms of impeding the exploitation of localized intra-industry externalities
than it will do good in terms of allowing for more inter-industry spillovers.
Empirical analysis, see e.g. Bottazzi and Peri (2002), suggests that knowl-
edge spillovers in the EU may indeed be much more important in an intra-
industry context than in an inter-industry context. If so, then regional inequal-
ities would potentially have been more eﬃciently eliminated through direct in-
come transfer to the EU periphery. Such a transfer could be based on general
tax schemes. But as integration proceeds, and trade barriers fall, a transfer
scheme could also be funded by taxing of the industrial agglomeration in the
EU core, which would contribute not only to increased horizontal equity, but
also to increased vertical equity.
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6 Appendix
Functions and Parameter values used for simulations:
ρi =
¡
1 + LSi
¢−ε
, ϕi =
¡
1 + LSi
¢ξ
σ = 3, µ = 0.5, LU = 6, LSW = 2
Figure 1:
Zero knowledge spillovers: ε = ξ = 0
Weak inter-industry spillovers: ε = 0.4, ξ = 0.1
Strong inter-industry spillovers: ε = 0.4, ξ = 0.2
Figures 2-9:
Zero knowledge spillovers: ε = ξ = 0
Relatively weak intra-industry spillovers: ε = 0.2, ξ = 0.1
Relatively strong intra-industry spillovers: ε = 0.4, ξ = 0.1
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Regional inequalities: Ratio of real earnings 
Strong inter-industr
Weak inter-industr
Zero inter-industry
Figure 1: Regional inequalities as function of trade cost and inter-industry
spillovers
25
Skilled workers
Unskilled workers in the periphery
Unskilled workers in the core
∆ Welfare
Skilled workers
Figure 2: A regional policy of relocation: Impact on real earnings; case (i): Zero
knowledge spillovers
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Unskilled workers in the periphery
Unskilled workers in the core
∆ Welfare
Figure 3: A regional policy of relocation: Impact on real earnings; case (ii):
Relatively weak intra-industry knowledge spillovers
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Skilled workers
Unskilled workers in the periphery
Unskilled workers in the core
∆ Welfare
Figure 4: A regional policy of relocation: Impact on real earnings; case (i):
Relatively strong intra-industry knowledge spillovers
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∆ Total welfare
Relatively strong Intra-industry spillovers
Relatively weak Intra-industry spillovers 
Figure 5: A regional policy of relocation: Impact on total welfare
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∆ Total welfare
Relatively strong Intra-industry spillovers
Relatively weak Intra-industry spillovers 
Figure 6: A regional policy of direct income subsidies: Impact on total welfare
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Welfare: Direct income subsidies versus relocation
Relatively weak Intra-industry spillovers 
Relatively strong Intra-industry spillovers
Zero spillovers
Figure 7: Comparison of regional policies: Impact on total welfare
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Welfare
Policy I: Relocation
Policy III: Direct income transfers
financed by a tax on the 
agglomeration specific factor
Policy II: Direct income transfers 
financed by a general tax scheme
Figure 8: Regional policy I-III: Comparison of the impact on social welfare
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Tax rates
Equity tax rate
Agglomeration sustaining tax rate: 
Relatively weak intra-industry spillovers
Agglomeration sustaining tax rate: 
Relatively strong intra-industry spillovers
Figure 9: A regional policy based on taxation of the industrial agglomeration:
Equity versus agglomeration sustaining tax rates
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